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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) because this matter is a criminal appeal from the Third District
Court, a court of record, and does not involve a charge of a first degree
felony or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether defendants request for counsel for the breath test was an
invocation of counsel that merits the protection of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and their
progeny.
If this Court rules that defendants request for counsel for the breath
test merited such protection, whether the trial court's failure to suppress
defendant's post-Miranda statements resulted in prejudicial error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for this Court's review of the trial court's factual findings
that support the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to
suppress is the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,
1186 (Utah 1995), citing State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992).
Clear error will be found only if this Court decides that the factual findings
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were not supported by the record. Id. citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
935-36 (Utah 1994).
This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness,
Trover, 910 P.2d at 1186.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City is satisfied with defendant's Statement of the Case and
therefore does not submit its own Statement of the Case. See Rule 24(b)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The trial court correctly ruled that defendant's request for

counsel for the breath test did not merit the protections of Miranda,
Edwards, and their progeny. First, the trial court correctly found that
defendant was asking for an attorney to help defendant determine whether to
take the breath test. Second, defendant did not ask for an attorney to act as
an intermediary between himself and Officer Falkner in a custodial
interrogation situation. Third, under Utah's Implied Consent Law defendant
has no right to counsel when deciding whether to take the breath test.
Fourth, Officer Falkner clearly explained to defendant that defendant had no
right to an attorney as the Utah Implied Consent Law requires. Fifth, if
defendant ambiguously invoked his right to counsel, then Officer Falkner
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clarified defendant's request and defendant's rights. Defendant then
intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel.
POINT II: If this Court holds that there was an evidentiary error and
the admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements was an error, then that
error was not prejudicial to defendant. The statements were limited and not
important to the City's case as the statements mitigated defendant's pre-arrest
statement that he had drunk a six pack. Further, by chronologically putting
the last of defendant's four beers at 11:30 p.m., one and one-half hours
before the crash, the post-Miranda statements further mitigated defendant's
pre-arrest statement regarding the six pack. In addition to the limited nature
of the post-Miranda statements and their lack of importance to the City's
case, the City had a strong case and defendant's Post-Miranda statements
were cumulative. Looking at the impact of the post-Miranda statements on
the jury it is clear the statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and not prejudicial to defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS BEFORE JUDGE DEVER WHEN HE
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
On April 21, 2005, the City and defendant appeared before Judge
Dever and argued their motions. No witnesses were called. Defense
counsel states during his argument, "I believe that the City would stipulate to
the facts which I have taken straight from the police report". (R. 136:4).
3

Although the City did not state on the record that it stipulated to the facts
that defendant took from the police report, City did state "[w]e!re generally
going to submit on the brief1. (R. 136:7). In his trial motion and
memorandum to suppress, defendant accurately quotes the responding
officer's narrative as follows: "At first he agreed to take the test but would
not blow into the tube. He then requested council [sic] before taking the
test. I explained to him over and over that he did not have a right to council
[sic] for the test and told him that he would be refusing the test if he did not
do as instructed. He refused the test." (R. 37).
Both the City and the defendant stated in their memoranda for the
suppression hearing that after defendant refused the breath test, Officer
Falkner read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he
understood his right to counsel and agreed to speak with Officer Falkner.
(R. 37, 44).
Post-Miranda defendant told Officer Falkner the following: defendant
"indicated that he had been drinking at a club and that he had consumed f6
beers, 4 beers (2 bottles 2 cans)[sic]\ He also indicated that his first drink
was at 8:00 and his last drink was at 11:30." (R. 37).
In response to defendant's oral argument, Judge Dever questioned
defense counsel as follows: "Wait, wait. The right that he [defendant]
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS FROM TRIAL
On October 17, 2004 at approximately 1:00 a.m. defendant drove his
extended cab pick-up truck southbound on West Temple approaching 600
South. Defendant drove "very fast" through his red light and "T-boned" a
sedan that was driving through on its green light on 600 South at West
Temple, injuring the sedan driver who was placed on a stretcher and
transported by ambulance to a hospital. (R. 138:14-15). Defendant did not
swerve or slow before hitting the sedan. (R. 138:15). Two eyewitnesses
saw defendant run the light. (R. 138:21). The light had been green for the
sedan driver for approximately "thirty, forty-five seconds" when defendant
hither. (R. 138:158).
Defendant hit the driver's side of the sedan as it entered the
intersection. (R. 138:15 and 120).
A third party witness, Ana Crowe, was driving approximately 20 feet
behind the sedan and testified as to the facts surrounding the crash described
above (R. 138:14). At trial, defendant testified that an animal ran in front of
his truck and defendant looked in his rearview mirror to see if he had run
over it. He testified that he looked forward again and for three to four
seconds before the crash his light was green. (R. 138:119). At the crash
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corner of 600 South and West Temple. (R. 138:139). The impact turned
both vehicles 90 degrees: it turned the sedan to its right and the extendedcab pick-up truck to its left. (R. 138:120). The vehicles finally came to a
rest where they are depicted in plaintiffs "exhibit 1" photographs (See
plaintiffs exhibit 1 and R. 138:119).
Officer Mark Falkner was dispatched to the accident. As Officer
Falkner approached defendant, at approximately five feet away, he could
smell alcohol on defendant. Officer Falkner could also smell alcohol on
defendant's breath. (R. 138:19). Officer Falkner saw that defendant had
watery, red bloodshot eyes. Officer Falkner also heard defendant's slurred
speech. (R. 138:20).
Officer Falkner asked defendant how much he had to drink.
Defendant responded that he had drunk a six pack. (R. 138:20). Officer
Falkner asked defendant if defendant's light was red or green. Defendant
responded "I'm not sure. As far as I know it was green." (R. 138:21).
Officer Falkner asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests
("FSTs"). Officer Falkner's DUI experience includes nine years as a patrol
officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department. In that time Officer
Falkner conducted approximately 100 DUI investigations. (R. 138:19-20).
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Officer Falkner received his NHTSA (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration) training at POST (Police Officers Standards
Training) (R. 138:26). Officer Falkner participated in alcohol studies at
POST as both a volunteer drinker and as a participant receiving training.
Officer Falkner has observed a correlation at his POST training between
how subjects performed on the FSTs and their blood or breath alcohol level.
At his POST training Officer Falkner was able to closely estimate the
subject's blood or breath alcohol level based on his performance on the
FSTs. (R. 138:27). Later, based on Officer Falkner's training and
experience and his observations of defendant, Officer Falkner determined
that defendant was too impaired by alcohol to safely drive and arrested him.
(R. 138:37).
The first FST was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test where
the officer requests that the subject follow a stimulus and looks for an
involuntary jerking of the eye, or nystagmus. Defendant's eyes exhibited
nystagmus on each test. Defendant failed that test. (R. 138:26).
Dr. Robert Rothefeder, an emergency physician, testified for the
defense. Dr. Rothefeder testified that alcohol is one of a number of
possibilities that would cause nystagmus. (R. 138:93). He also testified that
the testing he performs in a medical setting is not the same as NHTSA
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except for the nystagmus at maximum deviation. (R. 138:91). Dr.
Rothefeder testified that a closed head injury or a concussion could cause
HGN. (R. 138:93-94).
Defendant spoke to Dr. Rothefeder for the first time after Dr.
Rothefeder's testimony and before defendant's testimony. (R. 138:144-145).
After speaking with Dr. Rothefeder for the first time during trial and hearing
Dr. Rothefeder's testimony, defendant testified that he had a closed head
injury and that he hit his head on the driver's side door frame when he
crashed into the sedan. (R. 138:145, 120). Defendant, however, did not tell
anyone at the crash site that he had a closed head injury and that his head
hurt. (R. 138: 133-134). In fact, he was examined by an Emergency Medical
Technician (EMT) on site. In response to medical questions from the EMT
defendant failed to mention that his head hurt as a result of the accident or
that his head had hit his door frame. (R. 138:133-134). When asked if he
had told anyone at the crash site that his head hurt, defendant responded "I
didn't say anything to anybody." (R. 138:134). When further questioned
"even when directly asked several times?" Defendant responded "right". (R.
138:134). Defendant did remember to tell a sergeant on scene that
defendant had once had tuberculosis. (R. 138:131).
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Officer Falkner asked defendant if he had any physical problems.
Defendant answered that he had an ankle injury in 1997 which was seven
years prior to the accident (R. 138:23). When questioned by his attorney
regarding his ankle injury, the walk and turn test, and the one legged stand
defendant stated "I just did the best that I could11. (R. 138:125) Defendant
never stated that his ankle injury prevented him from performing these two
tests properly. On cross-examination, defendant testified that his ankle
injury did permit him to work at a laboratory at the time of the crash and to
spend eight hours a day on his feet. (R. 138:142)
The next FST that defendant performed was the nine step walk and
turn. (R. 138:30-33). Defendant did not perform the test as instructed.
Defendant stepped off the line, there was a gap between his heel and toe, and
he spun around rather than pivoting as instructed. In addition to these clues,
defendant was uncertain, shaky, and wobbly on his feet. Defendant failed
the test (R. 138:30-33,37,50).
The final FST was the one legged stand. Defendant was able to
follow most of the instructions given to him except that he waived his arms
and they came out farther than six inches from his body. (R. 138:34).
Significantly, however, defendant was unable to count to thirty. He counted
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21- 1,000 then 13 - 1,000 and then paused, and continued with 21- 1,000.
(R. 138:35).
Officer Falkner testified that he personally had undergone knee
surgery and had a permanent partial disability on his leg. Further, he
testified that he carries 35 pounds of equipment while on patrol. Officer
Falkner testified that he is capable of performing the FSTs even with his
physical limitation and with his heavy equipment on. (R. 138:35-36).
After the FSTs, Officer Falkner determined that defendant was
impaired by alcohol and unable to safely drive his vehicle and arrested
defendant based on the following factors: defendant ran a red light and hit a
car, defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, he had red bloodshot eyes,
slurred speech, his performance on the field sobriety tests, and his inability
to count to thirty. (R. 138:37). Defendant blew on the portable breath test
and the results were positive for alcohol. (R. 138:54)
Officer Falkner took defendant to the police station to take the breath
test. At the station, Officer Falkner told defendant that he needed to blow
hard into the machine.

Defendant was not blowing hard into the machine.

In response to defendant's next attempt, Officer Falkner told defendant
"You're not even blowing into this thing. You need to blow hard, and if you
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don't do it, it's going to come up and it's going to print out that there was no
sample—insufficient sample. . . You need to blow hard." (R. 138:39).
Officer Falkner explained to defendant if he was blowing hard enough
the machine would make a tone. The machine was not making any tone.
Officer Falkner testified that he has observed other people failing to blow
hard enough into the machine, hoping that the machine will not get an
accurate result. (R. 138:39).
Defendant then asked Officer Falkner "Do I need a lawyer?" Officer
Falkner responded "Well, that's up to you. It's not up to me, it's up to you."
(R: 138:39). Defendant responded "Well, I think I want my lawyer here
before I take this test." (R. 138:39).
Officer Falkner gave the following admonition regarding refusal to
take the test: "If you refuse to take - refuse the test or fail to follow my
instructions the test will not be given. However, I must warn you, your
driving privileges may be revoked for one year for a first refusal. . . Unless
you immediately request the test, the test can not be given." (R. 138:40).
After this admonition was read defendant responded "[w]ell I think I want
my lawyer here with me", (R. 138:40).
Officer Falkner then read defendant the admonition regarding right to
counsel and the chemical test. "Your right to remain silent and your right to
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counsel do not apply to the implied - sorry, implied consent law, which is
civil in nature and separate from your criminal charges. Your right to
remain silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do
not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you
submit to the test I'm requesting, I'll consider that you have refused to take
the test. I'll warn you if you refuse to take the test your driver's license can
be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited license." (R. 138:4041).
Officer Falkner read the previous admonition several times.
Defendant claimed he wasn't refusing to take the test. Officer Falkner
responded that "if you don't blow into the machine that is a refusal." (R.
138:41). Officer Falkner repeated his explanation many times. Officer
Falkner also told defendant "You do not have the right to have a lawyer here
for this test, and if you don't take it that is a refusal." Defendant responded
"I'm not refusing." Officer Falkner responded "No, by definition that is a
refusal. It says right here if you do not do this it's a refusal." (R. 138:41).
The discussion between Officer Falkner and defendant regarding
defendant's refusal to blow and his request to have an attorney before he
blew into the breath test lasted for approximately 20 minutes. (R. 138:54).
Ultimately, Officer Falkner determined that defendant was refusing to take
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the breath test and marked it as a refusal on his DUI report form. (R. 138:39,
41,55).
Officer Falkner gave defendant his Miranda rights from the preprinted DUI form which included defendant's right to remain silent and his
right to have counsel with him while he was being questioned. (R. 138:42)
(Miranda at 469). Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and he
agreed to talk to Officer Falkner. (R. 138:42). Defendant told Officer
Falkner that defendant had six beers. Then he told Officer Falkner that he
had four beers, "two bottles and two cans". (R. 138:43). Defendant told
Officer Falkner that he had drunk his first beer at 8:00 p.m. and his last drink
at 11:30 p.m. (R. 138:43).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL FOR THE BREATH TEST WAS NOT
AN INVOCATION OF COUNSEL MERITING PROTECTION
UNDER MIRANDA, EDWARDS AND THEIR PROGENY.
Judge Deverfs minute entry states "Defendant's Motion to Suppress is

denied. Court finds arguments from the City are persuasive and defendant's
1st request applied to counsel for the breath test. When Miranda was given
to the defendant he was willing to and did provide information." (R. 58).
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A.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE A CORRECT FACTUAL
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT REQUESTED COUNSEL
FOR THE BREATH TEST: THEREFORE, THE NARROW
ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS WHETHER
DEFENDANTS REQUEST MERITS THE PROTECTION OF
MIRANDA, EDWARDS AND THEIR PROGENY.

Judge Dever made a factual finding, supported by the record, that
defendant requested counsel for the breath test. Therefore, the remaining
issue before this Court is whether such a request merits the protection of
Miranda, Edwards, and their progeny. The portion of the minute entry that
states "defendant's 1st request applied to counsel for the breath test" is a
factual finding supported by the record which includes the parties' briefs. As
defendant said "I believe that the City would stipulate to the facts which I
have taken straight from the police report". (R. 136:4). Later in the hearing,
the City responds "[w]e're generally going to submit on the brief1 (R. 136:7)
and the City on appeal concedes it stipulated to the facts in Officer Falkner's
police report for the suppression hearing. Defendant's brief contains Officer
Falkner's police report narrative: "He then requested council [sic] before
taking the test. I explained to him over and over that he did not have a right
to council [sic] for the test and told him that he would be refusing the test if
he did not do as instructed. He refused the test." (R. 37).
Thus, Judge Dever correctly found by the preponderance of the
evidence that defendant was asking for counsel for the purpose of taking the
16

breath test. See U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding burden of
proof for suppression hearings is preponderance of the evidence). See also,
State v. Rynhait 125 P.3d 938; (Utah 2005) (holding that burden of proof
for prosecution in Fourth Amendment abandonment of expectation of
privacy at a suppression hearing is preponderance of the evidence).
Although it is clear from both the suppression hearing record and the
trial record that defendant asked for counsel for the breath test, the record at
the suppression hearing is sufficient. (R. 37, 138:39-42, 54). Both the trial
record and the suppression hearing record are clear that defendant requested
counsel for the purpose of taking the breath test. Defendant, however, relies
on the trial record for his argument. At the beginning of trial defendant reasserted his motion to suppress that is the subject of defendant's appeal. (R.
138:3-4). At the end of trial, however, defendant did not renew his motion
to suppress to indicate that new evidence has been put on the record that
supported his motion to suppress. (State v. Robinson et al, 797 P.2d 431
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that record of suppression hearing sufficient
to determine on undisputed facts whether the State met its burden on Fifth
Amendment voluntariness issue.)
The suppression hearing record is sufficient and clearly supports
Judge Dever's factual finding that defendant requested counsel only for the

17

breath test. The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether a request for
counsel for the breath test merits the protection of Miranda, Edwards, and
their progeny. This issue is discussed below.
B.

MIRANDA, EDWARDS, AND THEIR PROGENY
PROTECT DEFENDANTS WHO ASK FOR COUNSEL TO
ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN POLICE AND
DEFENDANT AND ATTACHES ONLY TO CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION: DEFENDANT DID NOT INVOKE HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE DISCUSSION
REGARDING THE BREATH TEST WAS NOT A
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.

The holdings of Miranda, Edwards and their progeny protect
defendants who ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between police and
themselves. This right to counsel attaches only to a custodial interrogation.
Defendant was not asking for counsel to act as an intermediary between the
police and himself. Defendant wanted to consult with counsel to determine
if he should take the breath test. (R. 138:39, 40). Further, the discussion
between the officer and defendant regarding the breath test was not a
custodial interrogation. The discussion below addresses Miranda's progeny
cases that defendant cited as support for his position that defendant invoked
his right to counsel.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) clearly states that a
defendant must ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between himself
and police. The Supreme Court held that "an accused, such as Edwards,
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having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to himM. Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.)
Edwards was in custody on burglary and murder charges when he was
read Miranda and submitted to questioning. Edwards was told that he was
implicated by another in the crime. Edwards provided a taped alibi defense
and then told police he wanted to make a deal. Sometime later Edwards
said "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id. at 479.
An attorney was not provided to Edwards.

Detectives arrived the

next morning to talk with Edwards. The detention officer told Edwards that
he "had to" speak with the detectives. The detectives identified themselves
and informed Edwards of his Miranda rights. Id. Edwards later implicated
himself in the crime. Id at 478-479.
In Edwards, a defendant told police he "wanted an attorney before
making a deal": he invoked his constitutional right to an attorney to act as
an intermediary between him and police. Then law enforcement told
defendant that he "had to" speak with detectives. Id. at 479. Telling
defendant he "had to" speak with detectives was inaccurate. After receiving
Miranda warnings, defendant gave an incriminating statement.
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The facts in Edwards differ significantly from the instant case.
Defendant asked for an attorney to help him decide whether to take the
breath test. He did not ask to have an attorney act as an intermediary
between himself and police. Officer Falkner told defendant accurately that
defendant had no right to confer with an attorney regarding the breath test.
(See discussion below.)
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), another case cited by
defendant to support his position, defendant clearly indicated he wanted to
have an attorney act as an intermediary between police and himself.
Defendant told police to lf[c]ome back Monday when I have a lawyer".
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148. Again, like in Edwards, police inaccurately told
Minnick that he had to speak with law enforcement and could not refuse.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that once counsel is requested, interrogation
must stop and cannot re-start until defendant has counsel present. Id. at 153.
The difference between Minnick and the instant case is that defendant said
he wanted an attorney to determine if he was going to take the breath test.
(R. 37). Defendant was invoking a right he did not have and Officer Falkner
gave him correct information on Utah's Implied Consent Law. (R. 37; R.
138:39-42,54).
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In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991), another case cited
by defendant, in a discussion of the difference between right to counsel
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court held "the
likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for
the applicability of Edwards." The rule of that case applies only when the
suspect:
"has expressed his wish" for the particular sort of lawyerly
assistance that is the subject of Miranda . . . It requires, at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to
be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in
dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.
Id. citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Again, in the instant case, defendant
did not "express[] his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that
is the subject of Miranda" and he did not make a statement that could be
"reasonably [] construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of
an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police." Id.
The defendant also cites U.S. v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10TH Cir.
1991), to support his claim that he invoked his right to counsel during the
breath test discussion. The important difference between Kelsey and the
instant case is what the defendant in Kelsey asked for and how the police
responded. In Kelsey, members of a police narcotics strike force were
searching Kelseyfs home when Kelsey arrived. The police searched Kelsey,
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found drugs on him and put him under arrest. Kelsey was handcuffed and
put on a couch while police continued to search. Three or four times Kelsey
clearly asked to see his lawyer. The police responded if they allowed
Kelsey to see his lawyer now they could not ask him any more questions and
would have to take Kelsey to jail. Eventually, one of the officers asked
Kelsey if he wanted to talk to the police. Kelsey agreed. At some point
during the interrogation the officer gave Kelsey Miranda warnings. Kelsey
gave an incriminating statement, 951 F.2d at 1198.
The Tenth Circuit found that the comments of the police to Kelsey
were important to the Miranda analysis:
It is clear from the exchange between Kelsey and the police
described above that the police intended to question Kelsey at
some point at his home, and that the police understood Kelsey
to be invoking his right to counsel during questioning.
Recognizing the import of Kelsey's request, the police stated
that if they allowed him to see his lawyer they could not
question him further. We thus conclude that Kelsey's request
for counsel was sufficient to bring this case within the ambit of
Edwards.
Id. at 1199.
In Kelsey the defendant clearly asked for an attorney to act as an
intermediary between himself and the police. The police clearly indicated
that they understood that defendant had asked for an attorney by saying if he
got his attorney the police could not speak with defendant further. In the

22

instant case, defendant did not ask for an attorney to act as an intermediary
between himself and the police. Defendant asked for an attorney to help him
decide whether to take the breath test. Defendant did not invoke his right to
an attorney. (R. 37)
The differences between the facts of the cases cited by defendant and
the instant case are critical. In the instant case defendant asked for an
attorney to help him decide whether to take the breath test. He did not say "I
want an attorney before making a deal", Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479; or to
"[c]ome back on Monday when I have a lawyer11, Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148.
Unlike Kelsey, defendant did not ask clearly to see his attorney three or four
times while sitting handcuffed on his couch watching police search his house
for drugs after finding drugs on him, Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199. Unlike
Edwards, defendant does not ,fexpress[] his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel", Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Neither does defendant
express his "desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial
interrogation by the police", McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
Another important difference between the instant case and the cases
cited by defendant is the accuracy of statements made by law enforcement to
defendants. In contrast to the inaccurate statements made by law
enforcement to defendants in the cases discussed above, Officer Falkner's
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statements were appropriate to ensure defendant understood his situation as
a refusal to take the breath test. (See discussion below.) Officer Falkner
was not trying to deceive defendant in order to obtain a confession.
Defendant makes a one paragraph reference to a "coercive atmosphere
discussed in Miranda" that was allegedly present in the instant case. (See
Appellant's brief 17.) In Kelsey, the Court describes "precisely the type of
coercive atmosphere that generates the need for application of the Edwards
rule" as follows:
Kelsey came home to find his house being searched by a police strike force,
including masked officers. He was arrested and handcuffed along with there
women whom he described as shaking and upset. His requests for an
attorney were met with the option of being taken to jail and with offers of
easier treatment if he cooperated and talked with the police. After holding
Kelsey for some period of time without allowing him to talk to his lawyer,
the police initiated uncounselled discussion with him. Kelsey agreed on the
condition that the three women being held would be released. Under
Edwards, these circumstances require that the resulting incriminating
statements be suppress.
Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199.There is no coercive atmosphere in Officer
Falkner's patient explanation of defendant's rights and responsibilities under
the Implied Consent Law. (See discussion below.)
Finally, Officer Falkner and defendant's discussion regarding the
breath test was not a "custodial interrogation" like the cases cited by
defendant: it was merely an explanation of defendant's rights. "The Fifth
Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present
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at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have
been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be
no occasion to determine is there had been a valid waiver.1' Edwards, 451
U.S. at 485-486. "'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion,
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself" Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (holding
that two officers discussing in the presence of the defendant the search for a
missing shotgun and their hope that a handicapped child would not find it
before police did was not a custodial interrogation).
Defendant was not being interrogated during the breath test
discussion. This is clear from the suppression hearing record, "[defendant
requested council [sic] before taking the test" and from the trial record, if
this Court decides to consider the trial record. (R.37). At trial, Officer
Falkner testified that he said "Unless you immediately request the test, the
test can not be given." Defendant responded: "Well I think I want my
lawyer here with me." (R. 138:40). Defendant then asked Officer Falkner
"Do I need a lawyer?" Officer Falkner responded: "Well, that's up to you.
It's not up to me, it's up to you." (R: 138:39). Defendant responded "Well, I
think I want my lawyer here before I take this test." (R. 138:39). I want to
call an attorney to see if I should take this test or not." (R. 138:54). There is
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no compulsion here "above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
Defendant's request for counsel for the breath test did not invoke the
protection of Miranda, Edwards and their progeny. Defendant wanted
counsel to help defendant determine whether he should take the breath test.
Defendant did not ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between himself
and Officer Falkner. In addition, Officer Falkner made accurate statements
of the law unlike law enforcement officers in cases cited by defendant.
Finally, Officer Falkner and defendant's discussion regarding the breath test
was not a custodial interrogation and thus defendant's request was not an
invocation of counsel.
C.

UNDER UTAH'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW AN
ARRESTED DRIVER DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL TO HELP HIM DECIDE WHETHER TO TAKE
THE CHEMICAL TEST: DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO
INVOKE A RIGHT HE DID NOT POSSESS.

Utah's Implied Consent Law is clear that defendant had no right to an
attorney to help him decide whether to take the chemical test. Defendant
attempted to invoke a right he did not have.
Utah's Implied Consent Law has not changed substantively since its
initial passage and the version of the code in force on the date of violation
was as follows: "A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is
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considered to have given the person's consent to a chemical test." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a)(2004). See also Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d
241, 243 (Utah 1978) (holding to drive is a privilege, not a right, so when a
person obtains a driver's license he is deemed to consent to the chemical test
in exchange for his privilege to drive).
Subsection 10(7) of the Implied Consent Law is clear that defendant
does not have a right to counsel: "For the purpose of determining whether to
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does not have the
right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician or any other
person present as a condition for taking of any test." Utah Code Ann. §416-44.10(7)(2004).
Utah case law clearly emphasizes the absolute nature of Utah Ann. §
41-6-44.10(7)(2004): a defendant does not have the ability to impose a right
to counsel or any conditions on the chemical test. "The statute plainly and
simply requires that such an accused [motorist who is arrested by officer
who has reason to believe motorist is driving in an intoxicated condition]
give his consent; and it does not give him the privilege of imposing any
conditions as a prerequisite thereto." Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 241, 243
(Utah 1978).
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Further, Utah case law has made the distinction between one's
Miranda rights and one's right to refuse a chemical test in Holman v. Cox,
598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979). While an arrested driver has a constitutionally
protected right to refuse to give statements to police, he does not have a
constitutionally protected right to refuse to submit to a chemical test or a
constitutionally protected right to counsel to help him decide whether to take
the chemical test. "While an arrested driver has the right to refuse to give
statements to a police officer, Miranda v. Arizona, [citation omitted], he
does not have the right to refuse a blood test be made. Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) [parallel cites omitted]." Holman 598 P.2d
at 1334.
In addition to its opinion in Holman, the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the lack of the right to counsel in Utah's Implied Consent Law in
Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). "[A] person does not have a
right to refuse to submit to a chemical test only the physical power;
therefore, as in Schmerber, there is no issue of counsel's ability to assist
respondent in respect of any rights he did possess." Cavaness, 598 P.2d at
353. The Court held that "respondent was not entitled to the assistance of
counsel in deciding whether or not to submit to the breathalyzer test.
[Citations omitted.]" Id. (Holding that the provision in the Utah Implied
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Consent Law denying defendant counsel did not deprive defendant of his
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
In Miranda, Edwards and their progeny defendants were invoking
constitutional rights that they did in fact possess. In the instant case,
defendant told Officer Falkner that he wanted an attorney before he decided
whether to take the breath test.' Defendant's request for counsel is invoking a
right that the defendant does not have. Per statute and case law, defendants
do not have a right to counsel when deciding whether to submit to the breath
test. Defendant has no constitutional right to confer with an attorney before
taking or refusing the breath test.
D.

OFFICER FALKNER MADE IT CLEAR TO DEFENDANT,
AS UTAH CASE LAW REQUIRES, THAT DEFENDANT
HAD NO RIGHT TO INVOKE COUNSEL FOR THE
BREATH TEST.

Utah case law requires that officers explain to an arrested motorist
that under the Implied Consent Law the motorist can lose his driver's
license if he does not take the chemical test. "The officer is responsible for
making this clear to the arrested motorist, and this duty must be discharged
in a fashion that will clearly alert the driver to the consequences of a refusal
whether expressed verbally or implied from his conduct and words."
Holman, 598 P.2d at 1334.
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If a motorist appears confused regarding his duties under the Implied
Consent Law and his rights under Miranda, the officer must try to dispel that
confusion.
If a drivers response indicates that he is refusing or postponing
the chemical test under the mistaken impression that he is
merely asserting a legal right that he thinks he may have under
Miranda, it is incumbent on the arresting officer to explain
unequivocally to the motorist that the Miranda rights to remain
silent and to consult an attorney do not apply to the decision to
take a chemical test."
Hodman, 598 P.2d at 1333-1334 (Emphasis added).
As the evidence clearly showed at the suppression hearing, Officer
Falkner explained clearly to defendant that his Miranda rights to consult an
attorney did not apply to the decision to take the breath test. (See R. 37).
The testimony at trial makes it even clearer that Officer Falkner
property explained the difference between defendant's rights and
responsibilities under Miranda and the Implied Consent Law. Defendant
told Officer Falkner that "Well, I think I want my lawyer here before I take
this test." (R. 138:39). I want to call an attorney to see if I should take this
test or not." (R. 138:54). " Officer Falkner then read defendant the preprinted admonition on his DUI report regarding right to counsel and the
chemical test to defendant.
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not
apply to the implied - sorry, implied consent law, which is civil
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in nature and separate from your criminal charges. Your right
to remain silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the
test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test
procedure. Unless you submit to the test I'm requesting, I'll
consider that you have refused to take the test. I'll warn you if
you refuse to take the test your driver's license can be revoked
for one year with no provision for a limited license.
(R. 138:40-41).
It is important to note that Officer Falkner's testimony regarding what
was said surrounding the breath test is undisputed testimony: defendant
never testified that Officer Falkner's recollections regarding the statements
both parties made regarding defendant's request for an attorney were
inaccurate. Therefore, it is clear that Officer Falkner clearly explained to
defendant his rights and responsibilities under the Implied Consent Law and
Miranda.
E.

IF THIS COURT FINDS DEFENDANT INVOKED HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THEN DEFENDANT
AMBIGUOUSLY INVOKED THAT RIGHT, OFFICER
FALKNER PROPERLY CLARIFIED DEFENDANT'S
AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS, AND DEFENDANT
KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

If this Court finds that defendant was invoking his right to counsel
under Miranda, Edwards, and their progeny, then this request was
ambiguous in light of the circumstances of the breath test discussion. Then,
Officer Falkner properly clarified defendant's ambiguous invocation and
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defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel
present during questioning and waived his right to remain silent.
A defendant makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous if "a
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel." Davis v. U.S., 512
U.S.452, 459 (1994) (Emphasis added). It was not clear to Officer Falkner
that defendant was invoking his right to counsel because "the light of the
circumstances" or context of the invocation was a discussion of the breath
test. IdL The suppression hearing record reflects that defendant "requested
council [sic] before taking the test." (R. 37).
The trial record also shows that it was not clear that defendant was
invoking his right to counsel. All of defendant's questions and statements
regarding an attorney were in the context of the breath test. "I think I want
my lawyer here before I take this test." (R. 138:39). Defendant insisted that
he was not refusing the test but he wanted his attorney with him before he
took the test. (R. 138:41).
When a defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an
attorney, further questioning is limited to "clarifying the request." State v.
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). All of Officer
Falknerfs statements were limited to the topic of the breath test, the Implied

32

Consent Law and defendant's Miranda rights. Thus Officer Falkner was
"clarifying the request". Id. at 947. Officer Falkner repeatedly explained
defendant's rights and responsibilities under the Implied Consent Law.
Eventually Officer Falkner marked defendant as a refusal and gave
defendant his Miranda rights which clearly indicated that he had a right to
talk to an attorney and have the attorney present with him while he was
being questioned. (R. 138:42). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. This explanation,
in addition to the prior explanations, makes clear to the defendant that he
had a right to an attorney before answering questions in contrast to his lack
of a right to have an attorney before taking the breath test. Defendant
indicated that he understood his rights and he agreed to talk to Officer
Falkner. (R. 138:42).
At one point during the breath test discussion defendant asked Officer
Falkner "Do I need a lawyer?". Officer Falkner properly responded "Well,
that's up to you. It's not up to me, it's up to you." (R: 138:39). Similarly
the Utah Supreme Court held that when a defendant responded "I don't
know" to the officer's recitation of his Miranda rights, it was proper for the
officer to respond ,f[y]ou don't have to answer questions if you don't want to.
It's up to you". State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997). The
defendant then nodded. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that considering
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the totality of the circumstances the officer's efforts in Leyva to clarify
defendant's statement were sufficient. The Court found that defendant's
waiver of rights was done knowingly and intelligently. Id.
Defendant's request for an attorney was not a clear invocation of
counsel so that a reasonable officer would understand that defendant was
invoking his right to counsel. In the context of the breath test discussion, it
was reasonable for Officer Falkner to think that defendant was asking for an
attorney to help him decide whether to take the breath test. Officer Falkner
clarified defendant's ambiguous request by explaining the Implied Consent
Law for which there is no right to counsel and providing defendant's
Miranda rights which clearly do allow counsel before defendant is
questioned. Therefore, defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to have counsel present during questioning and waived his right to
remain silent.
IL

IF THIS COURT RULES THAT THERE WAS AN EVIDENTIARY
ERROR AND DEFENDANT'S POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL, THERE
WAS NO PREJUDICE.
The admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements given to

Officer Falkner on the night of the violation were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and thus not prejudicial to defendant. State v. Kiriluk, 975
P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). " The standard is not whether one "might
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imagine a single juror whose decision hinged on [defendant's] confession.
Rather 'we look to what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the
confession on the minds of the average juror."1 Id at 472, citing State v.
Villarreal 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995)(quoting Harrington v. California,
395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)). The probable impact of defendant's postMiranda statements is that they supported defendant's claim that he was
impaired by alcohol so that he was unable to drive safely. Kiriluk provides
several factors to consider to determine the "probable impact" of the postMiranda statements on the jury which include: importance of statements to
prosecution's case, whether the statements are cumulative, and the overall
strength of the prosecution's case. Id.
Defendant states the City must show that the "remaining evidence
[without post-Miranda statements] presented at trial must be so weighty that
it assures the conviction". (See Appellant brief 18.) This standard is not
supported by case law.

Also, although defendant characterizes the

defendants post-Miranda statements as a "confession", defendant never
confessed to driving under the influence. Rather, as a discussion of the
record below shows, defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and
mitigated defendant's pre-arrest statements.
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The defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and not
important to the City's case as his statements mitigated defendant's pre-arrest
statement to Officer Falkner that defendant had drunk a "six pack". (R.
138:20). See State v. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's
case is a factor to consider when determining whether an error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt). Defendant's more detailed description
regarding the amount of alcohol he had drunk was "two bottles and two
cans". (R. 138:43). This response also supported defendant's theory of the
case which was although defendant had been drinking alcohol, he was not
impaired by alcohol so that he was unable to safely drive a vehicle. Further,
his post-Miranda time table regarding drinking put his last beer at 11:30 p.m.
(R. 138:43). That information also helps defendant's theory of the case since
the accident occurred after one in the morning, an hour and one-half later.
In addition to not being important to the City's case, defendant's postMiranda statements were cumulative because he repeated them on directexamination. (R. 138: 118.) Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473 (holding that whether
the testimony was cumulative is a factor to consider when determining
whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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The City had a strong case based on the testimony of a third party
witness, Ms. Ana Crowe, and an experienced DUI investigator Officer
Falkner. Further, physical evidence supported Ms. Crowe's testimony.
Finally, the City had defendant's pre-arrest statements that he thought the
light was green and that he had drunk six beers. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473
(holding "the overall strength of the prosecution's case" is a factor when
determining whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
Ms. Ana Crowe, a third party witness, was driving behind the sedan
on 600 South going east. She was approximately 20 feet behind the sedan as
they approached their green light at West Temple. The light had been green
for Ms. Crowe and the sedan thirty or forty-five seconds as it had turned
green when the sedan was one-half a block prior to it on 600 South. (R.
138:14 and 15, 158). As the sedan entered the intersection, Ms. Crowe saw
defendant run his red light going southbound on West Temple approaching
600 South. Defendant drove "very fast" through the light at West Temple
and 600 South and "T-boned" the sedan. (R. 138:14-15). Defendant did not
swerve or slow. Ms. Crowe stayed with the injured driver of the sedan until
police and ambulance arrived. (R. 138:16). Ms. Crowe's testimony was
disinterested and compelling.
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Two eyewitnesses at the scene told Officer Falkner that defendant ran
the light (R. 138:21).
Ms. Crowe's testimony disputed defendant's testimony that his light
was green when he was 30 to 40 feet from his intersection and that he was
traveling 35 miles per hour. (R. 138:136). At approximately 10 to 15 feet
away from the intersection defendant testified he was looking in his rearview
mirror to see if he had hit an animal that he saw in the road. Although, he
"was not really sure" regarding the time he estimated that three to four
seconds before impact he was looking forward and he saw his light was
green. (R. 138:138). He testified that he did swerve a little bit to the left
prior to contact. (R. 138:139).
Defendant's explanation for the crash was that he was looking into his
rearview mirror for an animal that he may have run over. (138:119). When
Officer Falkner asked defendant pre-arrest if his green was a red light or
green light, defendant responded "I'm not sure. As far as I know it was
green." (R. 138:21). Officer Falkner testified alcohol impairs judgment.
(R. 138:151). The jury could have concluded that defendant's perception of
the color of his light was impaired by the effects of alcohol and his light was
in fact red. The jury could have gone on to conclude that if defendant was
under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he could not tell if his light
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was green or red, then this inability rendered him incapable of safely
driving.
As Officer Falkner approached defendant, at approximately five feet
away, he could smell alcohol on defendant. Officer Falkner could also smell
alcohol on defendant's breath. (R. 138:19). Officer Falkner saw that
defendant had watery, red bloodshot eyes. Officer Falkner also heard
defendant's slurred speech. (R. 138:20).
At trial defendant claimed he banged his head on the driver's side door
frame. (R. 138:120). Although he told Officer Falkner about a 1997 ankle
injury and told another officer about once having tuberculosis, he never told
anyone, including the EMT who checked him for his injuries, that his head
hurt. (R. 138:121, 133-134).
Defendant testified that he had a 1997 ankle injury, seven years before
the crash. Defendant never testified that the ankle injury caused him to do
poorly on the nine step walk and turn or the one legged stand. Defendant
did testify that at the time of the crash he worked at a laboratory where he
spent eight hours a day on his feet. (R. 138:142).
Defendant's witness, Dr. Rothefeder, testified that a closed head injury
or a concussion could cause HGN. (R. 138:93). Defendant spoke to Dr.
Rothefeder for the first time after Dr. Rothefeder's testimony and before
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defendant's testimony. (R. 138:144-145). After speaking with Dr.
Rothefeder for the first time during trial and hearing Dr. Rothefeder's
testimony regarding HGN, defendant testified that he had a closed head
injury and that he hit his head on the driver's side door frame when he
crashed into the sedan. (R. 138:145; 120). The jury could have concluded
that the testimony regarding defendant banging his head and his closed head
injury was self-serving testimony to undermine Officer Falkner's HGN
testimony. The jury could also have concluded that the ankle injury did not
affect defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests. Such conclusions
would have further undermined defendant's credibility with the jury.
The jurors assessed the credibility of the witnesses: defendant,
Officer Falkner, Ms. Crowe and the Dr. Rothefeder. Then the jurors
determined the facts. The post-Miranda statements were not important to
assessing credibility or determining facts.
The admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus not prejudicial to defendant. The
defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and supported defendant's
explanation of events. The City had a strong case with the testimony Ms.
Crowe and Officer Falkner and defendant's pre-arrest statements. Finally,
defendant's post-Miranda statements were cumulative as he testified to the
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same information during his direct examination. Looking at the impact of
the post-Miranda statements on the jury it is clear the statements were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and not prejudicial to defendant.
CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing points, authorities and arguments, the City
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress.
Respectfully submitted this / 3
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LextsNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
* * * ARCHIVE DATA * * *
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2004 FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION * * *
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2005 UT 7, 2005 UT APP 37 * * *
* * * AND JANUARY 27, 2005 (FEDERAL CASES) * * *
TITLE 4 1 . MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 (2004)
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 . Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Number of tests —
Refusal — Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license -- Appeal -- Person incapable of
refusal -- Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence

(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given the
person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids
for the purpose of determining whether the person was operating or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation
of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer
having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation
of Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many of
them are administered.
(n) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or
more requested tests, even though the person does submit to any other requested test or
tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not select the test or tests to
be administered
(n) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is
not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the
requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace
officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses

to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer
requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not immediately
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, a peace
officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to
operate a motor vehicle. When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver License
Division, the peace officer shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(n) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of
arrest; and
(in) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, basic
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the Driver
License Division, also serve as the temporary license certificate.
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten
calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (2)(b), that the
peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 5 3 - 3 - 2 3 1 , or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 , or while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to
a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke
the person's license under this section is entitled to a hearing.
(n) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the
day on which notice is provided.
(in) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License
Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of
arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License
Division under this Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the
state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of.
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from
the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 5 3 - 3 - 2 3 1 , or 53-3-232;
or
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the
date of arrest under Section 41-6-44.

(f) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(u), if a hearing is requested by the person,
the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the
offense occurred.
(u) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver
License Division and the person both agree.
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 5 3 - 3 - 2 3 1 ; and
(n) whether the person refused to submit to the test.
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and the production of relevant books and papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(n) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested
to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the
person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver
License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection

(2)(I)(I)(B)

applies; or

(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from
the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 5 3 - 3 - 2 3 1 , or 53-3-232;
or
(II) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the
date of arrest under Section 41-6-44
(n) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(HI) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision
following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper.
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this
section may seek judicial review.
(II) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial Venue is in the district
court in the county in which the offense occurred.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering the person

incapable ol refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be
administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be
made available to the person.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine
the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine, breath, or oral
fluid specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person
whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital
or medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability
arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard medical
practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a physician of the
person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at
the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the
test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction
of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the person
to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or
other person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional
test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
any drug, combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
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NOTES:
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. - L a w s 1 9 8 1 , ch. 126, § 43 repealed former § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0
as last amended by L. 1977, ch. 268, § 4, relating to implied consent to tests, and enacted
present § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 .
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6" twice in Subsection ( l ) ( a ) and once in

Subsection (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-223" for "Section 4 1 2-130 or 41-6-44.4" in Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B); inserted "41-6-44.4, or 44-6-44 6" in
Subsection ( 2 ) ( f ) ( i ) ; substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130 or" and inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in
Subsection (2)(h) (i)(B); and added "or while having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body" at the end of Subsection (8)
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, substituted " 5 3 - 3 - 2 3 1 " for "41-6 44 4"
throughout the section.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, updated the second reference in Subsection
(2)(f)(i).
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, updated section references in Subsections
( l ) ( a ) , (2)(d), (2)(e)(.v)(B) and (2)(h)(.)(B).
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (2)(d) added "As a matter of
procedure" at the beginning and substituted "ten days" for "five days"; divided Subsection
(2)(f) into Subsections (2)(f) and (g), substituting "the hearing shall be conducted" for "and
conducted" and adding the venue provisions in Subsection (2)(f), and redesignated the
subsequent subsections accordingly; substituted "offense occurred" for "person resides" in
Subsection ( 2 ) ( j ) ( 2 ) ; and made stylistic changes.
The 2000 amendment by ch. 89, effective May 1, 2000, increased the time periods in
Subsections (2)(e)(iv)(A), (2)(e)(iv)(B), ( 2 ) ( I ) ( I ) ( A ) , and ( 2 ) ( I ) ( I ) ( B ) by six months; and
made stylistic changes.
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334, effective May 1, 2000, added "calendar" before "days" in
Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e)(n).
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2 0 0 1 , substituted "Section 78-46-28" for "Section
21-5-4" in Subsection (2)(h)(n).
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, updated a statutory reference in Subsection
(2)(i)(n).
The 2004 amendment by ch. 1 6 1 , effective May 3, 2004, substituted "within 24 hours of
the arrest" for "immediate" and "give" for "serve on the person" in Subsection (2)(b);
substituted "day on which notice is provided" for "date of the arrest" in Subsections (2)(d)
and (e); deleted "written" before "request" twice in Subsection (2)(e); throughout the
section, added "peace" before "officer" and substituted "for an offense that occurred within
the previous ten years from the date of arrest" for "after July 1, 1993"; and made stylistic
changes.
The 2004 amendment by ch. 205, effective May 3, 2004, inserted "or oral fluids" in
Subsections ( l ) ( a ) , ( l ) ( c ) , and (5)(a).
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.

